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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING:
WHEN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN WASTE DISPOSAL CROSSES
THE LINE BETWEEN REGULATING AND "OPERATING" UNDER
CERCLA
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")l has long been viewed by
courts and commentators as a big gun with a loose and unpredict
able trigger. From its inception, the statute has been read as having
the broad remedial purposes of removing toxins from the environ
ment and making the polluters pay the cleanup bill.2 Consequently,
courts have read CERCLA's liability provisions broadly, often in
1. 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1994), amended by the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605 to 9675 (1994».
2. For the purposes of this Note, which focuses on CERCLA's liability scheme,
the phrase "broad remedial purpose" refers only to polluter liability. This view of mak
ing those who pollute pay, dating back to the earliest CERCLA cases, has been
summed up again and again in the catch-phrase "broad remedial purpose," which has
become almost synonymous with the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 63-64 (1998) (holding that if and when the corporate veil is pierced, a parent
corporation may be liable for CERCLA violations); United States v. USX Corp., 68
F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "CERCLA ... is to be construed liberally to
effectuate its goals"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
1990) (stating that CERCLA is a "remedial statute designed to protect and preserve
public health and the environment"); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373, 1378 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that CERCLA's remedial "sweep" is "broad");
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986) (stating that courts are "obligated to construe [CERCLA's] provisions liberally to
avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes"); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen
eral Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 791 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that "by imposing strict
liability on broad categories of defendants, Congress also evidenced its intent to make
the responsible parties pay for the costs of the cleanup"); Rockwell Int'I Corp. v. IU
Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (explaining that "Congress sought
through CERCLA not only to expedite the cleanup of hazardous waste sites but also to
assure the equitable allocation of associated costs among all responsible parties"); Colo
rado v. Idarado Mining Co., [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578, 20,579 (D.
Colo. Apr. 29, 1987) (stating that the term "operator" must be interpreted liberally so
as not to defeat the statute's purpose). See generally Janeen Olsen, Comment, Defining
the Boundaries of State Liability Under CERCLA Section 107(a), 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
183,184 (1991) (stating that CERCLA was created to give the federal government "a
prompt and effective mechanism with which to respond to hazardous waste problems").
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ways that conflict with traditional notions of liability.3 Unfortu
nately for those courts that must apply this formidable liability
scheme, CERCLA is equally well-known for its poor draftsmanship
.
and vague language. 4
Section l07(a) of CERCLA imposes liability upon any statuto
rily defined "person" who owns or operates a contaminating facil
ity, or did so at the time the contamination took place. 5 There has
rarely been confusion where the same party owns and operates the
facility; in question. In contrast, when one party owns the facility
and another party has some degree of control over the operation of
the facility, there has been considerable confusion and variation in
the courts' methods of assessing "operator" liability?
3. See generally Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons from Parent
Liability Under CERCLA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 7, 7 (noting that
CERCLA's broad liability scheme often creates rulings that conflict with traditional
notions of liability). The courts have read CERCLA liability as strict, retroactive, and
capable of piercing the corporate veil. For further discussion of the courts' liberal read
ings, see infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
4. See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988)
("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently
for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage.
Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined
terms ...."); Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081 (noting that the Congressional pur
pose is "shrouded with mystery"); Kim E. Williamson & Thomas W. McCann, After
Union Gas II: The State as an "Operator" Under CERCLA, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 409, 409
(1991) (noting that vague CERCLA definitions have led to some degree of confusion
among interpreting courts). For further discussion of CERCLA's vague wording, see
infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
5. Generally, Section 107(a) imposes liability on four categories of covered
"persons":
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated a facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.c. § 9607(a) (1994).
6. "Facility" is a key term in determining CERCLA liability. For the statutory
definition of the facility" requirement see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
7. The two most common situations in which this issue arises are government
liability, the subject of this Note, and parent corporation liability, which is also ad
dressed in this Note. See infra Parts I.B & I.C for a discussion of the development of
operator liability in the context of government and parent corporation liability.
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This confusion is particularly noticeable when a plaintiff seeks
to impose CERCLA operator liability on a governmental body.
There are many situations in which a federal, state, or municipaUy
owned facility could subject a governmental body or agency to lia
bility.s However, governmental bodies, unlike private individuals,
regulate waste produced by other parties' facilities for the public
health and welfare. 9 Because of such regulation, governmental reg
ulatory activities almost invariably meet at least some of the CER
CLA liability requirements. 10 In addition, CERCLA's text and its
treatment by the courts support the theory that such relationships
may, in some circumstances, lead to liability for the government,11
Consequently, courts and commentators have recognized that a
conflict exists between two strong policy concerns related to gov
ernment operator liability: (1) CERCLA's expansive liability
scheme and (2) the need to protect governmental bodies from what
could become almost unlimited liability for hazardous waste dispo
sal. 12 While the courts must adjudicate government operator claims
8. Some examples include federally owned facilities, such as those maintained by
the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.,
972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining the possibility of government liability
for contamination at a Department of Defense facility). Because ownership and oper
ating control are consolidated in one party (the applicable government body), liability
would naturally attach to that party. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Com
merce, 29 F.3d 833, 843-46 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). But see id. at 848-49 (Sloviter, c.J.,
dissenting) (stating that Congress did not intend to waive the government's sovereign
immunity for this unique situation-steering war production).
9. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 324 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Moore, J., concurring) (stating that "[u]nlike private persons, states and their political
subdivisions possess and exercise regulatory power in their capacity as guardians of the
public health, safety and welfare").
10. See Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Timebomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup
of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197,233 (1988) ("Municipalities typically
engage in one or more of four primary [liability-inducing] relationships when handling
the solid waste generated within their borders."). See infra notes 26-30 and accompa
nying text for a discussion of the requirements for CERCLA liability.
11. See 42 U.S.c. § 9620(a)(1) (1994), which states:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject
to, and comply with, this ::hapter in the same manner and to the same extent,
both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including
liability under section 9607 of this title.
[d.
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) includes "United States Government, State, mu
nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body" in its
definition of "person." It is important to keep in mind that being a "person" is one
requirement for liability under Section 107(a). For discussion of the courts' recognition
and treatment of government liability, see infra Part 1.C.2.
12. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring) (discuss
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with CERCLA's liberal liability scheme in mind, they must also
take care not to overburden the government, and consequently the
taxpayers (through increased taxes). Thus, it is still uncertain how
much control the government must have over a facility before it
becomes an "operator."
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Best/oods,13 in which it provided a general definition of the term
"operator" in the parent corporation context. 14 Prior to Best/oods,
courts had used operator liability tests as varied as the cases in
which the issue had arisen. IS Following Best/oods, however, judges
have divided into two factions regarding the appropriate test for
government operator liability.
The first faction, typified by Judges Moore and Dowd in United
States v. Township 0/ Brighton ,16 advocates the use of multi-factor
tests and requires that plaintiffs seeking to impose government lia
bility meet a heavy, fact-intensive evidentiary burdenP This
method is consistent with long-standing, well established methods
of determining CERCLA liability in both the corporate and gov
ernment contexts. IS Best/oods called this longstanding test into
question by offering no more specific a test than a simplified defini
tion of "operator."19 However, Best/oods did not explicitly dis
ing the importance of having a clearer "actual control" standard for district courts to
use); see also United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold
ing that the state agency did not amount to an "owner" as defined by CERCLA and
was, therefore, not liable); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783,
791 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same).
13. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
14. See infra text accompanying note 209 for the Bestfoods definition of operator.
See infra Part II.A for further discussion of Bestfoods.
15. The courts have not been able to settle on any particular liability formulation.
Rather, they have advocated various approaches that have emphasized different factual
requirements. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64-66 (emphasizing control over the
waste-creating mechanism as a key factor); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare
Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing active employee manage
ment and control over waste disposal mechanisms); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (declining to require actual control, in favor
of "authority to control" test); Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 483-85
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (refusing to hold government liable even though it managed work
ers, controlled finances, managed costs, and was aware of waste disposal measures);
United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1450 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(requiring "day-to-day" control).
16. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998). Brighton is the only circuit court case after
Bestfoods to have considered the question of government operator liability.
17. See id. at 314-15.
18. See infra Part I.C for discussion of this heightened "actual control" test.
19. See Bestfaads, 524 U.S. at 66-67.
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credit the use of traditional multi-factor tests. 20 Thus, judges in this
group argue that the traditional multi-factor tests are a necessary
auxiliary that assists in applying the Best/oods definitional test. 21
The second pattern, advocated by Judge Boggs in Brighton,
simply requires satisfaction of the general definition found in
Best/oods. 22 Use of this lower evidentiary burden places govern
mental bodies on par with similarly situated parent corporations.
Part I of this Note examines the legislative, statutory, and com
mon law background of CERCLA operator liability, focusing on
how this background pertains to governmental bodies. Part II ex
amines Best/oods and Brighton, the only circuit court case since
Best/oods to examine government operator liability. Part III argues
that the appropriate test for government operator liability is a syn
thesis of the Bestfoods test and the traditional multi-factor tests.
Such a synthesis would appropriately balance the competing inter
ests of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose and limited government
liability.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND OF CERCLA OPERATOR LIABILITY

CERCLA Liability: The Broad Remedial Purpose

Congress designed CERCLA to provide the federal govern
ment with the "tools necessary for a prompt and effective response
to problems of national magnitUde resulting from hazardous waste
disposal ... [and to ensure] that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and re
sponsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."23
To accomplish this goal, CERCLA established a comprehen
sive response system that allows the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to undertake cleanup using resources from what is
commonly known as the "Superfund."24 Alternatively, the EPA
20. See id.
21. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at
333-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); see also Delaney v. Town of
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (analyzing a multitude of factors to
determine if the party being charged as an operator had "actual and substantial con
trol" over the facility).
22. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314.
23. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating that CERCLA's primary purpose is to "force polluters to pay for costs associ
ated with remedying their pollution"). See supra note 2 for the courts' recognition of
this broad remedial purpose.
24. See 26 U.S.c. § 9507 (1994). Congress envisioned the Superfund as a hazard
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may bring suit against any potentially responsible persons to com
pel cleanup.25 Liability is predicated upon four factors: 26 (1) the
contaminated site's status as a "facility,"27 (2) the defendant's status
as one of four statutorily defined liable "persons,"28 (3) the pres
ence of a "release" or "threatened release" of a hazardous sub
stance,29 and (4) response costs incurred by a non-responsible
party.30 Once a defendant is deemed liable under the statute, that
party becomes responsible for undertaking the cleanup, or for reim
bursing the EPA if it conducted the cleanup.31
Once the cleanup is accomplished, CERCLA authorizes the
party who paid for the cleanup (a governmental or private entity)
to recoup its expenses by bringing suit against other parties respon
ous substance response trust fund out of which the federal government could pay for
cleanup of contaminated sites. See id. Revenues for the fund were to be collected by
reimbursement from other liable parties found to have caused the contamination. See
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1994). Revenues were also to be collected through a tax imposed
on certain industries. See Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization: How Is the Clinton Administration Han
dling Hazardous Waste?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 245, 247-48 n.22 (1998). The
status of the Superfund is a source of some legislative confusion today. Created as a
companion to CERCLA, the Superfund was later reauthorized by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986). In 1990, Congress extended the Superfund's funding authority through 1994.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat.
1388-319 (1990). However, since then, Congress has failed to amend or reauthorize
CERCLA or the Superfund. Thus, there is no government money flowing into the
fund, and the EPA has "taken steps to shut down the Superfund program if the finan
cial resources are unavailable." Rhoads & Shogren, supra, at 250.
25. Potentially responsible persons are listed in 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a) (1994). For
the full text of this section, see supra note 5. The government may bring suit against a
private party to compel cleanup if "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health exists." 42 U.S.c. § 9606 (1994). See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992).
26. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1198; Donald M. Carley, Note, Environ
mental Law-The Federal Government Must Share in the Pain of CERCLA Cleanup
Costs, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 93,97 (1995).
27. All four categories of liability under § 9607(a) mention "facilities." CERCLA
defines "facility" as "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipe
line ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located
...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994).
28. See id. § 9607(a) (listing the four categories). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 5. It is the "operator" provision of this section that is the primary con
cern of this Note.
29. See id. § 9607(a)(4). Under this section, parties can only be held liable if
there is a "release, or a threatened release ... of a hazardous substance." Id.
30. See id.
31. See id. § 9607(a).
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sible for the contamination. 32 The party that brings suit must then
show that the four-part test for liability applies to the third party as
well,33
To include as many potential contributors as possible, courts
have taken a broad approach to CERCLA liability, reading the
statute as requiring strict liability,34 allowing piercing of the corpo
rate veil,35 and allowing retroactive liability.36 In addition, liability
is not limited to current owners or operators of polluting facilities,
32. See United States v. Reilly, 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). If the
government funds the remedial action, it may bring suit against any parties responsible
for the contamination. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir.
1992). Alternately, if a private party is forced to undertake the cleanup, that party may
bring suit for cost contribution against other responsible persons. See id. at 1197-98; see
also Bernard J. Reilly, Superfund Reform for the l05th Congress, SC27 ALI-ABA 1, 5-6
(1997) (describing Superfund authorization for EPA to recoup cleanup costs).
33. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of these four
factors.
34. CERCLA states that liability "shall be construed to be the standard of liabil
ity" applicable under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1321 (1994). See 42 U.S.c.
§ 9601(32) (1994). The courts have read the Clean Water Act as imposing strict liabil
ity, a fact that Congress was aware of at the time CERCLA was passed. See S. REp.
No. 96-848, at 32 (1980). As such, the intent of the actor is irrelevant to CERCLA
liability, and some parties may be held liable even if they made no affirmative acts. See
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir.
1990) (noting that CERCLA is a strict liability statute with only a limited number of
defined defenses available) (citations omitted); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court held that
CERCLA imposes a standard of strict liability); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress intended for CERCLA to be a
strict liability statute, even though the statute contains no such express provision).
35. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62-63 (1998) (holding that a par
ent corporation may be liable under CERCLA for its subsidiary's actions, relying on
common law principle that the corporate veil may be pierced when the corporate form
is being misused); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding corporate officer liable based upon the officer's day-to-day
control over the business), affd, 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); Uniteif States v. Conser
vation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-17 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (supplemental memo op.)
(holding corporate officer liable because he was primarily responsible for the facility's
environmental controls), modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
36. Courts have stated that the legislative history and plain language of CERCLA
point to retroactive liability. First, the covered persons provisions of CERCLA, 42
U.S.c. § 9607 (1994), use the past tense when describing acts leading to liability. See
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 732-33 (stating that defendants may be
liable for materials disposed of prior to CERCLA's enactment). Second, CERCLA's
"statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive." Id. (citing H.R.
REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125); see
also United States V. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (D. Colo. 1985) (stating that
CERCLA's "effective date" provision merely "indicates the date when an action can
first be brought and when the time begins to run for issuing regulations and doing other
future acts mandated by the statute").
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but attaches to any former owners or operators who were responsi
ble for contamination. 37 In further support of its broad remedial
purpose, CERCLA lists only three narrow defenses to liability for
an established owner or operator: contamination caused by an act
of God,38 an act of war,39 or the act of a third party.40

B.

"Operator" Liability Under CERCLA
CERCLA's operator provisions41 include a broad pool of po
tentially liable parties. Rather than being limited to just the facil
ity's owners, litigants may also seek contribution from those
"persons" that operated the facility.42 In United States v.
Bestfoods,43 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, noted
that this enlarged group of potentially liable parties could even in
clude "a saboteur who sneaks into the facility at night to discharge
its poisons out of malice."44 The term "operator" is thus pivotally
37. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(2) (1994) (holding liable "any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated" a contaminating facility);
North Carolina ex rei. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr. Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
(holding former corporate owner of a facility liable even though the corporation was
dissolved).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I) (1994). The statute defines "act of God" as "an
unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented
or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." Id. § 9601(1). This defense has
remained relatively untested and largely useless to defendants. See United States v. MI
V Santa Clara I, 887 F. Supp. 825, 843 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that a storm at sea was
not an "act of God" because it had been forecast, and thus could have been protected
against).
39. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(2) (1994). Although "act of war" is undefined in
CERCLA, one court has defined the term as the use of retaliatory force taken by a
state to inflict damage on an enemy. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp.
962,972 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (rejecting defendant's "act of war" defense). Like the "act of
God" defense, the "act of war" defense remains relatively untested. See generally Mar
tin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creating a Viable Allo
cation Procedure for Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. REv. 59,79 (1998) (noting
the lack of cases dealing with the "act of war" provision).
40. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(3) (1994). This provision has proven the most valua
ble of CERCLA's limited defenses; however, even defendants that rely on it are hin
dered by three substantial limitations: (1) a contractual relationship between the
defendant and the polluter negates the defense, (2) the defendant must show that the
third party is the sole cause of the harm, and (3) the defendant must show that he
exercised due care and took reasonable precautions against potential harm caused by
foreseeable acts of the third party. See McCrory, supra note 39, at 79-80.
41. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(I)&(2) (1994). See supra note 5 for the full text of
these provisions.
42. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1998).
43. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
44. Id. at 65. This nefarious, fictitious character could be held liable under
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important because the determination of whether a party is an oper
ator could determine whether or not the court will impose liability.
Despite the importance of the term "operator," courts gener
ally agree that the statute provides little or no guidance regarding
its meaning. 45 Section 101(20)(a) of CERCLA simply defines the
"owner or operator" of an on-shore facility as:
(ii) ... any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in
the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment,
or similar means to a unit of state or local government, any per
son who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at
such facility immediately beforehand.46

In addition, legislative history sheds little light on the matter. Like
many of CERCLA's provisions, the legislative history surrounding
the term "operator" has been criticized frequently for being circu
lar, vague, and practically useless. 47
In situations where one party is both the owner and the opera
tor of a facility, the task of determining operatorship is relatively
easy.48 However, the task becomes infinitely more difficult when
§ 9607(a)(2), which provides liability for anyone who operates a facility at the time a
release of hazardous materials takes place. See 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
Although Justice Souter made this comment before actually discussing what types of
activities could result in operator liability, he is clearly revealing his view of the broad
implications of the Best/oods Court's operator liability test. For the Best/oods test, see
infra text accompanying note 209.
45. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986) (stating "the structure of section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched
together compromise Act is not a model of statutory clarity"); see also Best/oods, 524
U.S. at 66 (stating "[w]e may again rue the uselessness of CERCLA's definition of a
facility's 'operator' as 'any person ... operating' the facility") (citation omitted); United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.1. 1989) (stating that "CER
CLA's definition of 'owner or operator' is not especially illuminating"), affd, 910 F.2d
24 (1st Cir. 1990).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
47. See Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 411-12 (noting that what little
legislative history does exist on "operator" liability is, like the wording of the statute
itself, circular) (quoting H.R. REp. No. 96-172, pt. 1, at 37, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6182, which defines operator as a person "carrying out operational
functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement"); see also
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)
(noting that the court was unable to glean anything from legislative history other than
the statute's broad remedial purpose, and stating that "CERCLA's legislative history is
shrouded with mystery").
48. For example, if an independent corporation owns and carries out the daily
operations of a facility there is little question that the corporation would be liable as an
operator. See, e.g., Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 409-10.
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two or more parties share control of the facility.49 Two or more
parties sharing control of a facility is prevalent in the context of a
parent corporation's control of a subsidiary and government control
of privately-owned facilities. 50 In those cases, the courts have fo
cused on the degree of "actual control"51 required to make a party
an operator. 52 Government and parent corporation operator liabil
ity share a common lineage which the following section will discuss.
C.

"Actual Control" in the Parent Corporation and Government
Contexts

"Actual control" is a broad, nebulous term that nonetheless
manages to generally reflect the equally broad and nebulous state
of CERCLA operator liability. The phrase was first used by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit53 and has
been repeated frequently by the courts discussed in this Part. Gen
erally, "actual control" refers to the proposition that a parent cor
poration or government agency must exercise some degree of direct
control over a facility to be held liable for a release. 54
However, the "actual control" test was not always the estab
lished law. For some time the courts flirted with alternative tests
requiring that, to be an operator, a parent corporation only needed
49. For example, when a subsidiary corporation owns and carries out the daily
operations of a facility there remains the question of how much influence the parent
corporation had over the actions of the subsidiary in running the facility. See, e.g.,
Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 410 (noting that when more than one party
could be construed as an operator liability can attach to each operator that meets the
appropriate criteria).
50. In the parent corporation context, control of the facility in question may be
shared by the owning corporation and the parent corporation. In the government con
text, control may be shared by the owning corporation and a government body
(through regulation or direct supervision). See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the
tests that have evolved to evaluate liability in these contexts.
51. The "actual control" test holds a corporation liable for the violations of an
other corporation if it exercised "substantial control" over the other corporation. See
FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (citing Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221
(3d Cir. 1993».
52. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 845-46 (holding the federal government liable
for contamination emanating from a privately-owned, but government-controlled, facil
ity); Rockwell Int'! Corp. v. IV Int'! Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(establishing a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a parent
corporation can be held liable for waste disposed of by a subsidiary).
53. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743
(8th Cir. 1986) (stating that the defendant "had actual 'control' over the NEPACCO
plant's hazardous substances").
54. See supra note 51.
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to have the authority to control a facility, regardless of whether or
not such control was actually exercised. 55 In a leading case, United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp. ,56 the Eleventh Circuit held that a se
cured creditor (not a parent corporation) could be held liable if it
was "participating in the financial management of a facility to a de
gree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment
of hazardous wastes."57 However, this "authority-to-control" test
has fallen into disfavor among the courts, many of which have
weighed authority-to-control against actual control and chosen the
latter.58 Other courts have implicitly rejected the authority-to-con
trol test by requiring affirmative acts on the part of the parent cor
poration or governmental body.59
The viability of the actual control test appears to be assured
now that the Supreme Court has adopted it in United States v.
Bestfoods. 60 The remainder of this Note examines the origin of the
"actual control" test and the competing theories of how it should be
applied to government operator liability.

55. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th
Cir. 1992) (stating that authority to control, even when there is no actual control, sub
jects a parent corporation to liability); see also United States v. Carolina Transformer
Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992) (following the Nurad holding).
56. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
57. Id. at 1557.
58. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
"an individual may not be held liable as an 'operator' ... unless he or she (1) had
authority to determine whether hazardous wastes would be disposed of and to deter
mine the method of disposal and (2) actually exercised that authority"); Lansford
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that "the district court, by applying the 'actual control' test, applied the correct legal
standard with respect to the operator liability issue"); United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that "[t]o be an operator requires more
than merely complete ownership and the concomitant general authority or ability to
control that comes with ownership").
59. See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (requiring
"substantial control" over a facility to be held liable); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that "a party must do more than stand by and fail to prevent the contamination. It must
play an active role in running the facility, typically involving hands-on, day-to-day par
ticipation in the facility's management"). Only the Fourth Circuit in Nurad has failed
to retreat from its position favoring the authority-to-control test. See Nurad, Inc., 966
F.2d at 842.
60. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). The Supreme Court specifically stated that an operator is
"someone who directs," not someone with authority to direct. See id. at 66. For further
discussion of the Bestfoods decision and its implications, see infra Part II.A.
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Parent Corporation Operator Liability: Development of
the Traditional Multi-Factor Tests

Prior to Bestfoods, lower courts relied upon extensive, fact-in
tensive tests to determine whether a parent corporation had suffi
cient control over a facility to be considered an operator. 61 Various
courts' liability tests have been divergent in their use of specific cri
teria; however, there was a common theme. Generally, a defendant
was considered an operator if it exercised control over a facility's
operations, personnel, and finances (or some combination of the
three).62
Due to the lack of statutory or legislative guidance regarding
CERCLA operator liability, the first appellate courts to consider
operator liability began looking to cases decided under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), which has a definition of "operator" identical
to CERCLA's.63 One commonly cited decision under the CWA is
Apex Oil Co. v. United States,64 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit based liability upon three primary
factors: (1) control over the people and mechanisms that caused the
contamination, (2) the ability to stop or reduce the pollution, and
(3) ability to know of the contaminating release. 65
The courts in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical CO.66 and Idaho v. Bunker Hill CO.67 expressly adopted
the Apex Oil CWA standard in the CERCLA context. 68 Similarly,
61. See infra this Part for a discussion of these tests and their development.
62. This categorization of the traditional multi-factor operator tests is my own.
The courts have applied various factors, presented with different levels of specificity.
These courts' holdings will be discussed in this section. A synthesized test of specific
factors advocated by the various courts would be unreasonably long and complex.
However, the following discussion will show that the factors applied by the various
courts fall generally into the framework of operationaVpersonneVfinancial control.
63. See 33 U.S.c. § 1321(a)(6) (1994), which states, '''owner or operator' means
... (B) ... any person owning or operating such ... facility." See Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (expressly naming the CWA test as applica
ble in the CERCLA context); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp.
391,417 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (supplemental memo op.) (expressly adopting the CWA test
and citing to Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976), as analogous);
United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (holding corporate officer liable on the basis of factors used in CWA test),
affd in relevant part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
64. 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976).
65. See id. at 1293.
66. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
67. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
68. See Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. at 672 ("The court believes that the [Apex
Oil test, as adopted by the Northeastern court,] ... may properly be employed to deter
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the court in United States v. Carolawn Co. 69 adopted the CWA stan
dard in a CERCLA context by reference to Northeastern.
Although retaining the basic standard that an operator must
have some type of control, the actual control "operator" test was
further refined in Colorado v. Idarado Mining CO.70 The Idarado
court recognized the Northeastern standard, and also examined
such additional factors as stock ownership, control over marketing,
authority to execute contracts for the subsidiary, and control over
personnel actions.7 1 The Idarado court held a parent corporation
and a wholly-owned personnel services subsidiary liable for pollu
tion caused by a subsidiary mining operation. 72 Specifically, the
court held Newmont Mining Corporation, the parent corporation of
Idarado, liable on the basis of stock ownership, the ability of
Newmont to execute contracts for Idarado, a high degree of overlap
between the officers of the Idarado Mine and Newmont, and the
application of Newmont's personnel policies to Idarado.73 In short,
the court found that the parent corporation was "intimately" and
pervasively involved in the management of the Idarado Mine.74
Therefore, the court held that the Newmont Mining Corporation
was an "operator" under CERCLA.75
A noteworthy development in Idarado was the addition of a
broad new element to the actual control test. The court remained
faithful to the CWA standard by adopting the elements of person
nel and operational control (specifically relating to pollution).76
However, the court also discussed contractual control and stock
mine when a parent corporation becomes an owner or operator with respect to a sub
sidiary's facilities."); Northeastern Pharrn. & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 848 (stating
"this Court considers the Eighth Circuit's [CWA test] analysis significant in defining an
employee's liability under CERCLA").
69. [1984] 14 Envt!. L. Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984) (adopt
ing the CWA test, as applied in Northeastern).
70. [1988] 18 Envt!. L. Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 20,578, 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29,
1987) (stating that in Northeastern, "[T]he court adopted, for the purposes of determin
ing liability under CERCLA, the definition of 'person in charge' as that phrase is used
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act").
71. See id. at 20,578-79 (drawing heavily on a general discussion of these factors
in United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-17 (W.O. Mo. 1985)
(supplemental memo op.), in which the district court held a corporate officer liable
under CERCLA based on the CWA test factors).
72. See id. at 20,579.
73. See id. at 20,578.
74. See id. at 20,579.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 20,578. See supra text accompanying note 65 for the CWA formula
tion of these factors.
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ownership and then added a third factor-participation in the fi
nancial decisions of the facility, or, financial controP7 Thus, the
new test that emerged required control over the facility's personnel,
operations, and finances.
Less than a year later, the court in Rockwell International
Corp. v. IU International Corp. ,78 without citing to Idarado, effec
tively adopted the test advocated in that case.79 In Rockwell,
Rockwell purchased the facility in question from a subsidiary of IU
and later found contaminants on the facility's property.80 Rockwell
initiated monitoring and testing procedures at the site and brought
suit against IU to recover costs and to obtain a declaratory judg
ment that IU would be responsible for any future cleanup costs. 8t
The court denied IU's motion for summary judgment and held that
there was sufficient evidence to find that IU could have been con
sidered an operator. 82 In reaching its decision, the court listed a
number of relevant factors, including the hiring of personnel and
determination of their duties, creation and enforcement of operat
ing plans and guidelines, active participation in waste disposal pol
icy, and review of requests for equipment purchases. 83 Although
the Rockwell court did not specifically refer to the Idarado formu
lation of the actual control test, the factors it discussed fell within
the Idarado formula: personnel control (IU appointed officers for
the subsidiary), operational control (IU officers established and
monitored compliance with operational guidelines, specifically
those regarding disposal of waste), and financial control (IU offi
cials reviewed recommendations for the purchase of equipment).84
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.85 also adopted
the Idarado factors.86 Hines and Mid-South Wood Products, a sub
sequent purchaser of the Hines facility, sued Osmose Wood Pre
serving, a chemical supplier that built a portion of the facility used
for chemically treating wood, to recover cleanup costs.87 The court
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See !darado, [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,578-79.
702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
See id. at 1390-91.
See id. at 1386.
See id.
See id. at 1390.
See id. at 1390-91.
See id.
861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 157-58.
See id. at 155-56.
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determined that Hines, and not Osmose, was the operator at the
time the contamination occurred. 88 In making this determination,
the court noted that Hines hired employees (personnel control),
regulated production (operational control, albeit not relating to
waste disposal), and determined to whom, and at what price, prod
ucts would be sold (financial control).89
In United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. ,90 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied factors similar to
those in Idarado and reaffirmed the importance of control over
waste disposal policy.91 The United States brought suit under
CERCLA against Kayser-Roth for the cost of cleanup operations
necessitated by the actions of Stamina Mills, a wholly-owned, but
then defunct, subsidiary of Kayser-Roth. 92 The First Circuit af
firmed the district court's determination that Kayser-Roth was an
operator of the facility.93 The First Circuit noted the parent's "per
vasive control" over Stamina Mills-control that satisfied all three
elements of the Idarado test. 94 The court listed numerous ways in
which Kayser-Roth influenced Stamina Mills' personnel and finan
cial actions, but it paid special attention to Kayser-Roth's control
over environmental pOlicy.95 Specifically, the court found that Kay
ser-Roth approved the installation of a cleaning system that used
potentially dangerous chemicals and that Kayser-Roth controlled
the methods used for disposal of those chemicals. 96
In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir
cuit adopted the actual control test in Lansford-Coaldale Joint
Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.97 In Lansford-Coaldale, Tonolli
Canada created a wholly-owned subsidiary, Tonolli PA, to operate a
smelting facility in Pennsylvania. 98 The parent corporation, IFIM,
88. See id. at 158.
89. See id.
90. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
91. See id. at 27-28. The line of previously discussed cases firmly established that
control over waste disposal policy was essential; however, the Hines court conspicu
ously, but only temporarily, broke this chain by failing to address this point. Instead the
court of appeals found it notable that Hines had simply "decid[ed] how much to pro
duce." Hines, 861 F.2d at 159.
92. See Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 25.
93. See id. at 28.
94. See id. at 27.
95. See id. at 27-28.
96. See id.
97. 4 F.3d 1209, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1993).
98. See id. at 1213.
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later purchased both Tonolli Canada and Tonolli PA.99 After a
Water Authority study showed an impending contamination from
the smelting facility, the Authority brought suit against IFIM, To
nolli Canada, and Tonolli PA to recover future CERCLA cleanup
costsY)O The Lansford-Coaldale court upheld the applicability of
the actual control test but remanded for further findings of fact re
garding the roles played by certain officers. 101 The Third Circuit
stated that operator liability is "reserved for those situations in
which a parent or sister corporation is deemed, due to the specifics
of its relationship with its affiliated corporation, to have had sub
stantial control over the facility in question."lo2 Significantly, the
court noted that there are no decisive factors in determining opera
tor liability, but that courts must look to the "totality of the circum
stances."103 However, in creating a list of relevant factors for the
district court to consider, the Third Circuit listed issues that fit
neatly into the categories of personnel, operational, and financial
control.1 04
Thus, throughout the history of CERCLA operator liability,
the actual control test established by Idarado and Northeastern ap
peared frequently in the context of parent corporation operator lia
bility with varying weight given to the different factors.105 Despite
the courts' wide-spread divergence, a general pattern developed
showing emphasis on the factors of personnel, financial, and opera
tional control.
.
Government Operator Liability
Statutory and judicial justifications for imposing government
liability
2.

a.

Under CERCLA, governmental bodies may be held liable as
operators. Such liability is indicated expressly in CERCLA's lan
99. See id. at 1213.
100. See id. The Water Authority dropped Tonolli PA from the suit because the
company went bankrupt. See id.
1Ol. See id. at 1222.
102. Id. at 1220.
103. See id. at 1222.
104. The "critical questions" that the district court needed to consider were con
trol of day-to-day operations, the sharing of corporate officers, authority held by those
officers, and control over the release of hazardous substances. See id. at 1222-24.
105. See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1995) (focusing on
participation in liability-creating activities); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193
(8th Cir. 1994) (focusing on control over disposal of waste); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipe
fitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing the impor
tance of control over waste disposal and personnel actions).
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guage and has been upheld by the courts. 106 A statutory "person"
under CERCLA includes the "United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any in
terstate body,"107 and operator liability is predicated on actions
taken by a "person."108 In addition, the Supreme Court's decision
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 109 solidified the possibility of gov
ernment liability.u o Thus, there is clear historical support for gov
ernment operator liability.
The outer boundaries of government operator liability are
fairly well-defined. In situations where the government owns a fa
cility that is staffed with government personnel, there is little ques
tion that the governmental body would be liable as an operator in
the event of a release of hazardous substances. 1ll Control would be
so pervasive as to leave little room for argument that the govern
106. See infra text accompanying note 107 for CERCLA language authorizing
government liability. However, courts have been reluctant to actually subject non
owner government bodies to operator liability. See, e.g., United States v. Vertac Chern.
Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding the government not liable); United
States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing, for the first time,
the possibility of government operator liability based upon control of a civilian facility,
but declining to hold the state liable); Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding the government not liable despite overwhelming indicia of
control over the facility in question); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 1432, 1449-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the government not liable despite pres
ence of significant indicia of control over facility). But see FMC Corp. v. United States
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding the federal
government liable for activities at chemical plant during World War II); United States v.
Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
1990) (finding the state liable based upon indicia of contrOl). See infra this Part for an
in-depth discussion of the rationales used by these courts to avoid government liability.
107. 42 U.S.c. § 9601(21) (1994).
108. See id. § 9607(a).
109. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
110. In Union Gas, the Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that Con
gress abrogated State sovereign inlmunity with respect to CERCLA. See id. at 6. This
specific holding of Union Gas was overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
66 (1996), in which the Supreme Court limited the potential for private party suits
against States that refuse to consent on Eleventh Amendment grounds. However, as
the concurrence in United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998),
noted, Seminole Tribe would not apply in suits brought by the United States. See id. at
323 n.2 (Moore, J., concurring). This issue of the breadth of sovereign inlmunity under
CERCLA remains unsettled and is outside the scope of this Note.
111. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 849 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "when
the government undertakes to respond to society's problems through operation of its
own facilities ... its activities are analogous to those of private parties, and it is conse
quently subject to 'operator' liability under CERCLA"). See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil
Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537-43 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining the possibility of government
liability for contamination at a hazardous waste surface impoundment facility).
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ment was not operating the facility. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, few would argue that the government should be held lia
ble for actions taken during the cleanup of another party's already
contaminated site. 112 By undertaking the remedial action, the gov
ernment would be acting only in its regulatory capacity, and thus
not as an operator. However, as the following discussion will show,
the appropriate test for liability arising from the gray area between
these extremes is far from resolved.

b.

Importation of the "actual control" standard into the
government operator context

The first opportunity for a federal appeals court to apply the
actual control test to a government actor arose in United States v.
Dart Industries, Inc.1 13 In Dart, the United States sought reim
bursement for cleanup costs from private parties and companies
who allegedly generated hazardous waste materials found in an
abandoned waste site.1 14 Those defendants then filed a third party
complaint against the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control ("DHEC"), claiming that it was an opera
tor and that it negligently issued permits for waste disposal at the
site and failed to install monitoring wells as it had promised. 115 The
Fourth Circuit held that DHEC was not an operator, noting that it
had simply exercised its statutory duty of "loosely regulat[ing]" the
facility after it had been abandoned by its previous owners.116 The
court refrained from any detailed discussion of what would make
the state an operator. 117 Although it did not cite any corporate op
erator liability cases, the Fourth Circuit stated that a finding of lia
bility would have to be predicated on "hands on" activities at the
facility, noting that there was no allegation that the state had any
active participation in the activities that created the waste or con
tributed to its release.1 18
112. Indeed, CERCLA specifically states that "[n]o State or local government
shall be liable ... for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an
emergency created by the release ... of a hazardous substance generated by or from a
facility owned by another person" short of "gross negligence" or "intentional miscon
duct." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1994).
113. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). Note that the Fourth Circuit decided Dart a
year before the Supreme Court gave its express approval of state liability for monetary
damages in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
114. See Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d at 145.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 146.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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The following year, in United States v. New Castle County,119 a
federal district court expanded on the vague actual control test used
in Dart, giving a detailed list of factors that courts should consider
when determining liability.120 New Castle concerned a "model
landfill site" in which the State of Delaware took some degree of
interest.121 Delaware was involved in various aspects of the land
fill's planning and operation. 122 When the United States brought
suit against various defendants for cleanup of the site, the defend
ants brought a third party CERCLA complaint against the state. 123
The district court declined to hold the state liable since Delaware
had simply acted "as protector of the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens ... with [out] any proprietary or financial interests at
stake."124 However, the court did recommend a list of factors to
consider when deciding whether to impose operator status:
The Court should inquire, inter alia, into whether the person
sought to be strapped with operator status controlled the fi
nances of the facility; managed the employees of the facility;
managed the daily business operations of the facility; was respon
sible for the maintenance of environmental control at the facility;
and conferred or received any commercial or economic benefit
from the facility, other than the payment or receipt of taxes. 125

The New Castle formulation of the actual control test represents an
adoption of the factors applied by courts in the corporate context,
but with the added element of economic gain, which would be likely
to remove a majority of potential government operators from the
scope of CERCLA liability.126
In the same year that New Castle was decided, the district court
m CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp.127 expressly
119. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989).
120. See id. at 869.
121. See id. at 862.
122. See id. The state aided in "site selection, planning, design, operations and
determining the types of wastes suitable for disposal at the Site." Id. In addition, the
state "required the submission of detailed information about the Site, its surrounding
area and proposed procedures for the operation of the Site." Id. The State Board of
Health also monitored the site frequently. See id. at 863.
123. See id. at 857.
124. Id. at 866.
125. Id. at 869. The court noted that this list was not to be read as exhaustive, but
as "part of a para materia inquiry in determining operator status." Id.
126. Although it is conceivable that a government agency could choose to operate
a facility of profit, none of the actors in the cases this Note discusses had such a motive.
127. 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.O. Mich. 1989).

240

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:221

adopted the Apex CWA test1 28 in the government operator context.
CPC Int'l and Aerojet sought to recover response costs 129 from the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR").130 CPC
Int'l claimed that MDNR had agreed to operate purge wells at the
site in question and provide local residents with an alternate water
supply, which it failed to do.l3l There was some question as to
whether MDNR had promised to operate the purge wells. How
ever, the court noted that, if it had, MDNR's apparent nonfeasance
did not protect it from liability,132 The Aerojet court found actual
control by characterizing MDNR's assumption of control as an af
firmative act.13 3 Thus, the Aerojet court denied MDNR's motion to
dismiss.13 4 MDNR also argued that holding government bodies lia

128. See id. at 788 (citing United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127
(5th Cir. 1972), adopted in Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir.
1976». The Aerojet case falls somewhat outside the mainstream of actual control test
jurisprudence because one could read the opinion as advocating an authority-to-control
test. See supra text accompanying note 65 for the Apex text. The Aerojet court quoted
language adopted in Apex that tends to indicate the authority test. See supra notes 55
57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the authority-to-control test. However,
the Aerojet court also quoted language from Dart that seems to indicate an actual con
trol requirement: "The generators are unable to specify any 'hands on' activities by [the
defendant] that contributed to the release of hazardous wastes." Aerojet-General
Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 788 (quoting United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146
(4th Cir. 1988». In any event, the Aerojet court was never clear as to which test it was
using. Still, the important issue is the multi-factor test the Aerojet court advocated,
particularly considering that the Sixth Circuit later expressly rejected the authority-to
control test. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir.
1998) (rejecting the authority-to-control test). It is also important to note that the Aer
ojet court failed to make mention of New Castle or the economic gain factor that the
New Castle court imposed.
129. CERCLA defines "response" as "removal, remedy, and remedial action."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994). The statute defines "removal" as "the cleanup or removal
of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be neces
sary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the envi
ronment ...." Id. § 9601(23). "Remedy" and "remedial action" are defined as:
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addi
tion to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial dan
ger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment.
Id. § 9601(24).
For further discussion of CERCLA's response cost recovery infrastructure, see
supra notes 24-25.
130. See Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 785.
131. See id. at 786.
132. See id. at 788.
133. See id. at 788-89.
134. See id. at 792.
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ble creates a "disincentive for undertaking remedial actions. "135
However, the Aerojet court emphasized CERCLA's broad reme
dial purpose, implying that the importance of holding responsible
parties liable may outweigh the policy against avoiding government
liability.B6
The following year, in United States v. Stringfellow,137 a Cali
fornia district court held a government actor liable under CERCLA
for the first time. 138 The court based liability on the fact that the
state hired employees for the facility, made operational decisions,
actively controlled waste disposal at the site, opened and closed the
site, and regulated who could dump and what could be dumped at
the facility.B 9
Four years later, in the landmark case FMC Corp. v. United
States Department of Commerce,140 the Third Circuit held the fed
eral government liable as an operator for its actions during World
War II at a manufacturing facility owned by the American Viscose
Corporation ("AVC").141 The plant was one of the few in the coun
try that produced high tenacity rayon, a material pivotal to the
American war effort. 142
The government, under the auspices of the War Production
Board, Textile, Clothing and Leather Division, ("WPB"), instructed
AVC to expand and increase its production of high tenacity rayon,
and would, in fact, have seized the factory if AVC was unable to
meet the WPB's standards. 143 In order to help AVC facilitate this
expansion, the government, through the Defense Plant Corporation
("DPC"), provided AVC with leased government-owned equip
ment and machinery and hired a third party, Rust Engineering
Company ("Rust"), to design and install the equipment. 144 In addi
tion, through its contract with Rust, the DPC regulated the
135. Id. at 791.
136. See id. See infra Part III for a further discussion of the policies for and
against government liability.
137. [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990).
138. See id. See supra note 106 for discussion of courts' theoretical approval and
practical reticence regarding government liability. Also note that although the Aerojet
court denied the government's motion to dismiss, judgment was not actually rendered
against the government. See Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. at 792.
139. See Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,658.
140. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
141. See id. at 843-44. AVC later sold the property to FMC Corp., the plaintiff in
this case. See id. at 835.
142. See id. at 836.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 837.
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purchase of supplies, created operating plans for the facility, and
had the authority to remove the contractor's employees from the
facility.1 45 The DPC also installed a full-time representative at the
facility to monitor and supervise Rust's employees. l46
To provide a steady stream of raw materials to the plant, the
government built and maintained a sulfuric acid plant adjacent to
the AVC facility and contracted with a third party to build a carbon
bisulfide plant in the area. 147 The government required AVC to ac
cept the materials from these facilities. l48 When the government
decided the workforce at the AVC plant was inadequate, it pro
vided draft defer.ments to employees, recruited employees from
other industries, housed the incoming workers, and managed and
supervised the plant's employees. 149 To facilitate this new initiative,
the WPB assigned a full-time personnel manager to the facility.150
The government also regulated the supply and price of materials
flowing in and out of the factory.151 As a result, the government
became aware that the production of high tenacity rayon created a
great deal of waste, and "personnel present at the facility witnessed
a large amount of highly visible waste disposal activity."152
In 1982, testing of the area's groundwater revealed dangerous
chemicals that had been used in rayon production. 153 Subse
quently, the EPA initiated cleanup operations and sought to re
cover the cost from FMC, which in turn filed suit against the United
States Department of Commerce, claiming that the federal govern
ment was liable as an operator. 154
The FMC court held the federal government liable for cleanup
costs as an operator155 and arranger. 156 In finding operator liability,
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 837-38.
153. See id. at 835.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 845.
156. Arranger liability is predicated upon 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(3) (1994), which
imposes liability upon "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per
son ...." Id. Since the FMC court was divided on the issue of arranger liability, and
the issue of operator liability had already been settled, the court simply affirmed the
lower court's judgment on arranger liability without discussion. See FMC Corp., 29
F.3d at 846.
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the Third Circuit first adopted, in the government context, the ac
tual control test it had applied a year earlier in the parent corpora
tion context. 157 This test emphasized control of day-to-day
operations, the sharing of corporate officers, and control over the
release of hazardous substances. 15S In further defining this test, the
FMC court cited the tests applied by the courts in United States v.
New Castle County I59 and Colorado v. Idarado Mining CO.IOO
However, the court independently announced a list of what it called
the "leading indicia of control": control over items in production,
levels of production, the product's price, and customers to whom
the facility's owner sold the product. 161 Applying these factors, as
well as those from Idarado I62 and New Castle,163 to the facts of
FMC, the Third Circuit found that the government had sufficient
control of the facility to hold the United States liable as an opera
tor.1 64 Specifically, the court cited findings that the government
had controlled the facility's raw materials, built and sanctioned the
building of neighboring plants to support the AVC facility, created
and maintained a workforce for the plant, managed the personnel,
and controlled the product's price and market. 165
The Third Circuit distinguished FMC from Dart and New Cas
tie, cases in which the courts did not find sufficient government con
trol,l66 noting that, in Dart, the state had neither financial nor
157. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (stating that using the actual control test to
impose liability is inconsistent with '''traditional rules of limited liability for corpora
tions,'" but nevertheless is consistent with "CERCLA's broad remedial purposes")
(quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d
Cir. 1993».
158. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1222-24.
159. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989); see also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. The
New Castle court emphasized financial control, employee management, control over
daily business operations, control over maintenance of environmental controls, and
commercial or economic benefit received by the defendant. See New Castle County,
727 F. Supp. at 869. See supra text accompanying note 125 for the New Castle formula
tion of the actual control test.
160. [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 1987); see
also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843-44. The Idarado court emphasized stock ownership, the
ability of the defendant to execute contracts for the facility, a high degree of overlap
between the officers of the parent and subsidiary, and the application of the parent's
personnel policies to the subsidiary. See Idarado Mining Co., [1988] 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,578. See supra text accompanying note 73 for the Idarado test.
161. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843.
162. See supra note 160.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 843-44.
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operational control over the facility.167 In addition, the FMC court
found it significant that in neither Dart nor New Castle did the gov
ernment produce a product for its own use, as occurred in FMC. 168
The following year, in United States v. Vertac Chemical
Corp. ,169 the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on FMC in declining to
impose government liability po During the 1950's the facility in
question produced a number of chemical herbicides. l7l In 1961,
Hercules, Inc. purchased the facility and subsequently won a gov
ernment contract to make the chemical herbicide known as Agent
Orange for use in Vietnam. l72 In conjunction with this contract, the
government designated Agent Orange production by Hercules a
"rated order," to take precedence over any of Hercules' other con
tractsP3 The terms of the government contract were substantially
dictated by the Department of Defense. 174 In addition, the contract
subjected Hercules to government-created health and safety stan
dards, which were enforced by random inspections. 175
After repeated demands by the United States government that
Hercules increase production, the government facilitated the chem
ical manufacturer's importation of the necessary component chemi
cals. 176 The government waived import duties for these
components and issued a directive to a chemical supplier to ensure
that a constant supply of raw materials continued to flow to Agent
Orange producers, including Herculesp7
The government did not establish or attempt to establish waste
disposal policies, and Hercules did not consult government officials
on its waste disposal policiesP8 The government eventually discov
ered contamination, undertook cleanup, and sought cost recovery
from the owners and direct operators of the site. 179 The defend
ants, in response, filed suit against the United States, claiming that
167. See id. at 844.
168. See id.
169. 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995).
170. See id. at 808-09.
171. See id. at 806 (noting that at the time, the facility was owned by Reasor-Hill
Corp).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 806-07. These were required by the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.c.
§ 35 (1994). See id.
176. See Venae Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d at 807.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. These parties included Hercules, Inc.; Vertac Chern. Corp.; Uniroyal
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the government was a liable operator. 180
The Eighth Circuit held that the United States was not liable as
an operator181 or an arranger. 182 Adopting the FMC court's use of
the actual control test,183 the court emphasized two factors present
in FMC that were absent in the present case. First, in FMC the
government, not the manufacturer, determined the product the fa
cility would produce. l84 Here, Hercules chose to bid on the pro
ject.185 Second, in FMC the government "'exerted considerable
day-to-day control over American Viscose,"'186 including extensive
management of personnel, a factor which was absent in the present
case. No government representative ever "managed or supervised
any Hercules personnel."187
The same year that the Eighth Circuit decided Vertae, a Cali
fornia district court rejected government liability in United States v.
Iron Mountain Mines, Ine. 188 During World War II, the federal
government prohibited gold mining at the Iron Mountain Mine and
instead encouraged the mining of copper and zinc by instituting the
Premium Price Plan. 189 The owners of the mine entered into a con
tract that provided the government with all of the mine's output, as
well as the power to control the ore's marketing and direct the
opening of a new mine. 190 In addition, the government built new
roads to the mine, hired employees to work there, gave draft defer
ments to mine employees, managed the employees by instituting
salaries and setting work weeks, and discouraged employees from
leaving to work elsewhere.1 91 Later, when officials determined that
Chemical, Ltd.; and the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology. See
id. at 805.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 809.
182. See id. at 811. See supra note 156 for an explanation of arranger liability.
183. See id. at 808. The Vertae court borrowed heavily from FMC, quoting the
extensive list of factors weighed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. at 808
09. See supra text accompanying note 165 for a list of the FMC factors.
184. See id. at 809.
185. See id.
186. Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833,
844 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc».
187. Id.
188. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995). This case involved a number of claims
against the federal government and the State of California for both operator and ar
ranger liability; however, the operator claim against the federal government is the only
claim relevant to this Note.
189. See id. at 1436.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1449-50.
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the mine polluted a local reservoir, the owners brought suit against
the government, as an operator, to recover cleanup costS.192
Citing FMC and Vertac, the court declined to hold the govern
ment liable as an operator, stating that there was never any "hands
on, day-to-day" control over operations at the facility.193 Accord
ing to the Iron Mountain court, the government's actions in the
present case amounted only to "encouragement and regulation."194
In particular, the court noted three factors absent in this case that
were present in FMC: (1) installation of an on-site representative,
(2) leasing of, and control over, equipment used at the facility, and
(3) direct control over waste disposal.1 95
In Washington v. United States,196 the owner of a shipyard and
the State of Washington brought suit against the federal govern
ment claiming that it was the operator of a shipyard later found to
have caused pollution. l97 The government's involvement with the
facility included control and supervision of production by the place
ment of on-site representatives, participation in the management
and supervision of employees, the financing of the facility, control
of costs, and knowledge of the hazardous waste production result
ing from the facility's operation. 198
As in Iron Mountain, the court relied heavily upon "day-to
day" actual control in its analysis, determining that the government
could not be held liable as an operator. 199 This court also analo
gized heavily to FMC; however, as in Iron Mountain, the court
found the situation to be distinguishable. 2°O In Washington, the
court found four primary distinguishing facts: (1) the absence of the
War Production Board, (2) the fact that the shipyard continued to
produce the same product while under government control, (3) the
fact that the government never exercised its "authority" to seize the
plant, and (4) the fact that FMC involved nationwide regulations
allowing government control.201
192. See id. at 1436.
193. See id. at 1450 (citation omitted). See supra this Part for a discussion of the
FMC and Vertae decisions.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. 930 F. Supp. 474 (w.n. Wash. 1996). As previously noted, this Note will
focus only on the operator liability claim against the federal government.
197. See id. at 475-76.
198. See id. at 483-84.
199. See id. at 483-85.
200. See id. at 485.
201. See id.
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As can be seen from this review of cases, before the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Besifoods,202 the courts' well-estab
lished practice was to apply the multi-factor actual control test in
the context of government operator liability. In general, a govern
ment operator, like a parent corporation operator, was one that
controlled the personnel, operations (particularly regarding waste
disposal), and finances of the facility. However, despite these
guidelines, no specific set of factors ever emerged, and courts con
cerned about over-exposing governmental bodies to liability were
able to manipulate. the existing, inherently malleable tests in order
to prevent liability from attaching. The result was that many courts
recognized government operator liability as a theoretical possibility,
but few actually imposed it.203
II.

BESTFOODS AND BEYOND:

THE

CURRENT STATE OF .

GOVERNMENT OPERATOR LIABILITY

A.

United States v. Bestfoods: The Supreme Court Re-Writes the
Book-Or Does It?

In 1998, after roughly 15 years of litigation regarding the
proper test to apply for parent corporation operator liability cases,
the United States Supreme Court provided a test in United States v.
Bestfoods .204 The United States brought suit under CERCLA
against, among other subsequent owners, CPC International, the
parent corporation of the defunct Ott Chemical Company, to re
cover the cost of cleanup operations at Ott's facility.205 In deter
mining whether the parent corporation could be considered an
"operator," the Supreme Court closely scrutinized the statutory
definition of that term. 206 After examining the common usage of
202. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
203. See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that plaintiffs had not shown sufficient government control to warrant liabil
ity); United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
government may be held liable as an operator, but that in this case there had been
nothing more than regulatory activity undertaken by the state); Washington, 930 F.
Supp. at 482-85 (recognizing that government liability is possible, but refusing to im
pose it based on the facts of the case); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881
F. Supp. 1432, 1450-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to impose liability on the government
based upon the facts of the case); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854,
869-70 (D. Del. 1989) (refusing to impose liability on a state government based upon an
extensive list of required control factors).
204. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
205. See id. at 56-58.
206. See id. at 66-67.
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the word 207 and its context in an "organizational sense,"208 the
Supreme Court settled on the following definition:
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs
the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility ....
[A]n operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specif
ically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with
the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about
compliance with environmental regulations. 209

The Court also added that, in determining liability, one must con
sider "whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility
by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms
of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility."21o The Court con
spicuously declined to provide any further test by which to evaluate
liability. Instead, the Court simply used the vague terms "manage,"
"direct," and "conduct," which are all subject to varying interpreta
tions. In addition, the Court did not indicate whether this defini
tion applied to government operator liability.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods, there has
been no clear determination by the lower courts as to whether this
definition eliminates the need for additional operator tests.211 In
the parent corporation context, a number of federal district courts
have applied the Bestfoods definition without any reference to the
traditional multi-factor tests.212 In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Ter
Maat,213 the court held a business liable for its actions as an opera
207. See id. at 66. The Court looked to the dictionary to determine the normal
usage of the word, which stated: '''[t]o control the functioning of; run ....'" AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1268 (3d ed. 1992), and, '''to work; as, to operate a machine.'"
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1707 (2d ed. 1958).
208. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66. The Court stated that the "organizational
sense" was more appropriately fitted to the CERCLA context and defined the term as:
'''[t]o conduct the affairs of; manage: operate a business.'" AMERICAN HERITAGE DIC
TIONARY, supra note 207, at 1268.
209. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67.
210. Id. at 72.
211. Prior to Bestfoods, the courts of appeals had fashioned an extensive muiti
factor "actual control" test to determine when parent corporations and government
agencies were liable as operators. See supra Part 1.e.1 for a discussion of this test's
genesis. The traditional test is not necessarily exclusive of the Bestfoods definition.
However, prior to Bestfoods, lower courts focused less on a plain language definition of
the term and more on various control factors that would show the defendant was an
operator. See supra Part 1.e.1. The most general formulation of the test seems to be
that an operator is one who controls the personnel, operations, and finances of a facil
ity. See supra Part 1.e.1.
212. See infra this Part for a discussion of these cases.
213. 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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tor at its sister corporation's facility.214 The Browning-Ferris court
relied exclusively on the plain meaning of the word "operator."215
Similarly, in United States v. Green,216 a New York district court
denied a motion to strike an affirmative defense in which the de
fendant 217 argued that he had insufficient control over a facility to
qualify him as an operator under CERCLA.218 Citing Best/oods,
the court stated that the defendant could not be held liable unless
he "directly participated in the management of the facility's pollu
tion control operations including decisions pertaining to the dispo
sal of hazardous substances and compliance with environmental
regulations."219 The court made no mention of any traditional
multi-factor tests. Finally, in Datron, Inc. v. eRA Holdings, Inc. ,220
the district court found that.a business was not liable for a release
caused by its subsidiary.221 Like Browning-Ferris and Green, the
Datron court relied solely on the Best/oods definition, apparently
forsaking the traditional tests.222
In the government liability context, the courts' rulings have not
been so homogenous. In fact, judges have aligned into two factions.
One faction, typified by Judge Boggs in United States v. Township 0/
Brighton,223 favors a low threshold of evidence that focuses solely
upon the general operator definition provided by the Supreme
Court in Best/oods .224 This test does not expressly require the in
tensive fact-finding involved in the traditional multi-factor tests.
The other faction, consisting of Judges Moore and Dowd in Brigh
214. See id. at 765.
215. See id. at 763-64. The court found liability based upon actions taken by a
joint officer (defendant Ter Maat) in the name of both corporations. See id. at 764-65.
Among other things, Ter Maat, in his capacity as an officer for the sister corporation,
took steps to procure a pollution control permit and conducted correspondence with
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. See id.
216. 33 F. Supp. 2d 203 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
217. In Green, the defendant was not a parent corporation but a sole shareholder.
See id. at 209.
218. See id. at 217.
219. Id.
220. 42 F. Supp. 2d 736 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
221. See id. at 747-48.
222. Despite the fact that an officer of the parent corporation sought environ
mental liability coverage for the subsidiary, became involved in resolution of the EPA
complaint, and assisted in obtaining an easement for a drainage pipe, the Datron court
held that "[the parent's] involvement with the facilities falls soundly within the parame
ters of normal oversight." Id. at 748.
223. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
224. See id. at 313-14. See supra text accompanying note 209 for the text of this
definition. A New York district judge also adopted Judge Boggs' view in Delaney v.
Town of Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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ton, defers to traditional multi-factor actual control tests.225 This
high threshold requires that a plaintiff satisfy a fact-intensive in
quiry characterized generally by control over personnel, finances,
and operations at a given facility.226
B.

United States v. Township of Brighton227

In Brighton, a court of appeals addressed the issue of govern
ment operator liability under CERCLA for the first time. A three
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit heard the case. Judge Boggs wrote the opinion of the court,
adopting the Best/oods definition of operator. Judge Moore con
curred in the result, and Judge Dowd dissented in part and con
curred in part. Both Judges Dowd and Moore argued that the
traditional multi-factor tests were relevant in determining liability.
1.

Factual Background

In 1960, the Township of Brighton, Michigan contracted with
Vaughan Collett to use a portion of Collett's land as a municipal
dump.228 The township contracted to have Collett control the eve
ryday operations of the dump within specifications set by the town
ship, for which Collett was to be paid a monthly fee. 229 In 1965,
Collett began having trouble maintaining the dump and asked the
township for assistance. 23o The township agreed to provide a bull
dozer and to assist in eliminating some of the waste by having the
Junior Fire Department burn it.231
In the late 1960's, the State of Michigan began to regulate
dumps more strictly and repeatedly warned the township that Col
lett's property was not in compliance with waste disposal regula
tions. 232 In 1973, after it became apparent that the contamination
could not be easily remedied, the township decided to close the
dump.233 In 1989, a team of federal investigators examined the site
225. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 322-31 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at
331-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
226. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the development of this test.
227. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
228. See id. at 310.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 311.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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and determined that it qualified for Superfund234 money.235 The
United States undertook cleanup, and by 1995, the cost of cleanup
had risen to approximately $500,000. 236 The United States brought
suit against Collett and the township to recover the response
costS.237 After a bench trial, the district judge found the township
liable.238 On appeal, the township raised four defenses to liability:
(1) the hazardous wastes in question were confined to areas that
were not part of the township's dump, (2) it was not an "operator"
under CERCLA, (3) all hazardous wastes were contributed by
sources not affiliated with the township, and (4) the district court
erred in stating that the harm and costs were indivisible, thereby
holding the township liable for the entire cost of response. 239
The court rejected the township's first and third defenses, hold
ing that the entire property was a facility and that wastes had been
mingled.240 As to the fourth issue, the court remanded for further
action by the district court, noting that the lower court had made an
insufficient factual inquiry to support its holding.241 This Note will
next discuss the court's holding regarding the second defense.
2.

Judge Boggs' Opinion for the Court

The Brighton court recognized the competing policy interests
present in the case-the broad remedial purpose of CERCLA and
the government's need to regulate waste disposal for the public's
health and safety.242 Unable to determine from the record whether
the township had exercised sufficient control to be deemed an oper
ator under CERCLA,243 the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for further findings of fact. 244
In providing guidance to the lower court, Judge Boggs advo
cated an actual control test based largely upon the Supreme Court's
234. For a discussion of the Superfund and its uses, see supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
.
235. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 311-12.
236. See id. at 312.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id. This Note discusses only the second argument.
240. See id. at 312-13 and 317, respectively.
241. See id. at 319-20. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions that the dis
trict court should make further factual determinations regarding the divisibility of the
injury. See id. at 320.
242. See id. at 315.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 322.
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definition of operator in Bestfoods. 245 However, Judge Boggs ad
ded that the party being subjected to liability need not have com
mitted affirmative acts of pollution. 246 It is sufficient to show that
the party took affirmative steps to take control of a facility; subse
quent inaction is no defense. 247
Judge Boggs also cited three cases, Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons CO.,248 FMC Corp. v. United States Department of
Commerce ,249 and United States v. Dart Industries, Inc. ,250 for the
proposition that government operator liability is possible if regula
tion of the facility in question is extensive enough. 251 However,
Judge Boggs failed to accept any of the previously used multi-factor
liability tests. 252 Rather, he stated that "mere regulation does not
suffice to render a government entity liable, but actual operation
(or 'macromanagement') does. "253
245. See id. at 314 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998». See
supra text accompanying note 209 for the Bestfoods definition of operator. Generally,
this definition means that an operator is simply someone who "directs the workings of,
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility." Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66.
246. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 315. While there need not be affirma
tive acts of pollution to hold a party responsible, that party will be held liable as long as
it performed affirmative acts that made it an "operator" of the facility. See id. at 314
15.
247. See id. at 315.
248. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
249. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
250. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988).
251. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314-15.
252. Recall that the multi-factor test developed by the majority of the cases dis
cussed in Part I.e.1 required satisfaction of a lengthy factual analysis to establish opera
tor liability. Generally, such tests were predicated upon factors such as personnel,
financial, and operational control.
253. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 316. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York adopted Judge Boggs' view in Delaney v. Town of
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the only case after Brighton to address
government operator liability. That case involved a contract between the DeLuca fam
ily and the Town of Carmel which allowed the town to use a portion of the DeLucas'
land to dump septic wastes. See id. at 241-42. The town paid rent, required that the
property meet certain specifications, and maintained the roads leading to the dump site.
See id. at 242. Following a complex series of transactions over two decades, the plain
tiffs purchased property for development near the former dump site. See id. at 243-44.
The New York State Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation in
formed the plaintiffs that their wells were contaminated and should not be used. See id.
at 244. The plaintiffs brought suit against a number of parties, including the town. See
id. at 245.
The court cited to Brighton, applying the Bestfoods definitional test without rely
ing upon any particular set of factors. See id. at 260-61. After considering the facts of
the case and comparing them to the similar facts in Brighton, the court simply stated
that "[p]laintiffs offer no facts to show that Carmel exercised any ongoing control over
the disposal activities at the Site." [d. at 261. Although the court briefly mentioned
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3. Judge Moore's Concurring Opinion
Judge Moore agreed with Judge Boggs' finding that there was
insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusive finding of
operator liability.254 However, the concurrence also noted that
Judge Boggs failed to provide a specific operator liability test. 255
Judge Moore emphasized that, while government bodies have an
inherent burden to regulate waste disposal for the public health and
safety, private entities have no such burden.256 To expose govern
ment entities to excessive operator liability would '''have a chilling
effect on long-term remedial efforts, since states may be unwilling
to act when CERCLA liability is sure to be imposed."'257 Judge
Moore stated that it may be unwise to use the same liability tests
for both government and private actors. 258 In addition, the concur
rence noted that Judge Boggs' opinion provided insufficient gui
dance to the lower courts regarding an operator liability test. 259
To resolve these problems, Judge Moore suggested adopting
the test articulated in Rockwell International Corp. v. IU Interna
tional Corp.260 Specifically, Judge Moore emphasized the govern
ment's knowledge of the hazards caused by a facility's waste,
participation in the facility's opening and closing, management and
hiring of employees in areas relating to waste disposal, determina
tion of operating plans, control over waste disposal, and public dec
larations of responsibility for the facility.261
Judge Dowd's Dissent
Judge Dowd stated that the facts on the record were insuffi
cient to hold the government liable as an operator. 262 Judge Dowd,
4.

some of the traditional control factors (operational and personnel control), it made no
indication that any of them could be determinative. See id. Instead, the court simply
noted that none of the potential factors had been met. See id. Thus, Delaney is not
particularly useful for the analysis of this Note, as the district judge failed to clarify why
he chose one test over the other.
254. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 323-28 (Moore, J., concurring).
255. See id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring).
256. See id. at 324 (Moore, J., concurring).
257. [d. (Moore, J., concurring) (quoting Olsen, supra note 2, at 204).
258. See id. (Moore, J., concurring).
259. See id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring).
260. 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Township of Brighton,
153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990) (citing Rockwell
Int'l Corp. v. IV Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988»). See supra
notes 78-84 and accompanying text for· a discussion of Rockwell.
261. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring).
262. See id. at 331 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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like Judge Boggs, stated that the Bestfoods standard is the control
ling law in cases of government liability and parent corporation lia
bility.263 However, Judge Dowd stated that the multi-factor actual
control tests adopted in cases like FMC, Dart, and New Castle are
consistent with the Bestfoods definition of operator liability.264 Ac
cordingly, the dissent stated that the township should be absolved
from operator liability because "there are no facts to indicate that
Brighton Township hired the employees of the dump, had the au
thority to supervise or fire them, or managed the finances of the
dump."265 Additionally, Judge Dowd found it dispositive to liabil
ity that the township did not control "daily operations" at the
facility.266

III.

A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE MULTI-FACTOR TESTS

Is

THE ApPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR GOVERNMENT
OPERATOR LIABILITY

Following United States v. Bestfoods ,267 the state of the law re
garding government operator liability remains unclear. On one side
of the argument lie the concurrence and dissent in United States v.
Township of Brighton,268 which follow the long CERCLA tradition
of predicating operator liability upon extensive multi-factor control
tests. 269 Although the concurrence and the dissent regarded
Bestfoods as controlling, they argued that the traditional tests are
consistent with Bestfoods. 270
263. See id. at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
264. See id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
265. Id. (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
266. See id. at 335 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
267. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
268. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
269. See supra Part I.e.l for a discussion of the development of these tests and
the factors the courts applied. Perhaps the most extreme example of the protracted
multi-factor test is Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996), in
which a federal district court declined to impose liability on the government, citing a
staggeringly specific and demanding list of necessary control factors. First, the Wash
ington court invoked the factors from FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Com
merce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), which included "active involvement" in a
plant's operation, government control of the product being created, levels of produc
tion, product price, and to whom the product would be sold. See id. at 843. The Wash
ington court then distinguished FMC: (1) the War Production Board was absent in
Washington, (2) the government in Washington did not force the facility to make a
product it otherwise would not have made, (3) the government lacked authority to seize
the plant, and (4) in FMC, a system of nationwide regulation was affected. See Wash
ington, 930 F. Supp. at 485.
270. In the Brighton concurrence, Judge Moore stated, "I believe that Judge
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Judge Boggs' opinion in Brighton offers the counter-argument
to the multi-factor tests. Judge Boggs discarded the long-standing
multi-factor tests and relied solely upon the definition offered by
Bestfoods. 271 Thus, the question remains whether government op
erator liability should be determined by Judge Boggs' less demand
ing Bestfoods definitional test or by the more demanding
traditional multi-factor tests. In answering this question, this Note
will first argue that the Bestfoods test is controlling in the govern
ment operator liability context. Next, this Note will consider the
policy arguments surrounding government operator liability. Fi
nally, this Note will apply the policy considerations to the two tests
and synthesize a workable liability standard.
A.

Does the Bestfoods Standard Apply to Government Operator
Liability?

In Bestfoods, the United States Supreme Court set the stan
dard for parent corporation operator liability under CERCLA.272
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not explicitly place any limita
tion on when this definition would apply. Thus, it may reasonably
be argued that courts should apply the definition in both the gov
ernmental and non-governmental contexts. 273 There is clear preceBoggs fails to define [the actual control] standard clearly so as to provide the lower
courts with direct guidance as to when a government entity engages in regulatory activi
ties extensive enough to make it an operator of the facility in question." Township of
Brighton, 153 F.3d at 325 (Moore, J., concurring). Judge Moore went on to advocate a
return to the multi-factor test as applied in United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990). See Township of Brigh
ton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Dowd stated that the
court should rely heavily upon the test elaborated in FMC and other multi-factor test
cases. See id. at 333-34 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). In addition,
Judge Dowd noted that "[a]lthough [numerous multi-factor control test cases] were de
cided prior to the Bestfoods case, they are completely in line with Bestfoods' holding."
Id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
271. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, con
curring in part). In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court stated:
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs the workings
of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility .... [A]n operator must man
age, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, op
erations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67.
272. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67-70. See supra note 271 for the Bestfoods defi
nition of "operator."
273. This seems to be one issue on which all three of the Brighton opinions agree,
as they each state Bestfoods is controlling on the issues of corporate and government
liability. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 314 (expressly adopting the Bestfoods
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dent for the proposition that a rule which applies to private actors
must apply equally to government actors. 274 Thus, it appears that
Best/oods provides the appropriate standard for both parent corpo
ration and government liability. However, as discussed in the fol
lowing sections, there are policy considerations applicable to
government agencies that are not applicable to private actors. 275
Although Best/oods appears to be the applicable standard, it is not
clear what implications this decision has for government operator
liability.
B.

What Exactly Does the Bestfoods Definition Require to
Establish Government Liability?

The Best/oods Court conspicuously failed to follow the stan
dard practice of the lower courts276 when it declined to use a multi
factor test and instead applied a simple, common usage definition
of operator. 277 However, the Court left open the question of
whether the definition forecloses the use of multi-factor tests in de
termining operator liability. To date, this issue has only been ad
dressed by one federal court of appeals, in United States v.
Township 0/ Brighton. 278 Brighton illustrated that courts could rea
definition); id. at 325 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing to Best/oods definition); id. at 333
(Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) ("I find that the Best/oods standard
should be applied to both the corporate form and the governmental entity situations.").
274. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (stating that "[u]nder [CERCLA] sec
tion 120 [the state] is in the same position 'as any nongovernmental entity' with respect
to CERCLA liability"); Thiokol Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 382
(6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "CERCLA also expressly provides that states are to be
treated in exactly the same manner as nongovernmental owner/operators ... including
liability"). But see supra note 203 for a discussion of cases in which the courts have not
imposed government liability. The cases discussed in note 203 have, in practice, created
a higher hurdle to government liability; however, none of them expressly indicated that
the standard is any higher than that which must be applied to corporate actors. In
short, it appears that the courts recognize that there is no statutory support for diverse
requirements, yet they remain reluctant to hold government agencies liable.
275. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of these policy considerations.
276. As noted earlier, courts evaluating government operator liability, like those
evaluating corporate liability, have consistently advocated multi-factor tests. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp., 29
F.3d at 843-45; United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988);
Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 482-85 (W.D. Wash. 1996); United
States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1449-50 (E.D. Cal. 1995);
United States v. Stringfellow, [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788
(W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869-70 (D.
Del. 1989).
277. See supra note 271 for the Best/oods definition of operator.
278. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
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son ably disagree on the issue. Writing for the majority, Judge
Boggs held that the Bestfoods test required nothing more than af
firmative acts indicating actual control and adopted that standard as
the exclusive test for operator liability.279 In contrast, the concur
rence280 and dissent281 both agreed that, although the Bestfoods
definition is applicable, it is nothing more than a guideline and that
courts must consider additional factors to give the definition mean
ing on a case-by-case basis.
It is essential at this point to determine whether the Bestfoods
Court intended for its decision to reinforce the status quo (minimal
government liability) or open new doors to government liability.
Having failed to answer this question expressly, the Supreme Court
forces the lower courts to examine the two traditional, conflicting
policy arguments relating to government liability: enforcing the
broad remedial purpose of CERCLA and protecting government
bodies from excessive liability.

C.

Enforcing the Broad Remedial Purpose v. Discouraging
Government Regulation: The Competing Policy
Considerations

The competing policy interests of CERCLA's broad remedial
purpose and the public interest in avoiding creation of a disincen
tive for government environmental regulation are pivotal to the
question of whether to apply the multi-factor tests or the simplified
Bestfoods test. Careful consideration of these interests indicates
that government actors may deserve special treatment in the appli
cation of the operator liability provision of CERCLA.282
279. See id. at 314.
280. See id. at 325-27 (Moore, J., concurring).
281. See id. at 333-35 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
282. Some areas of special government treatment are found in the text of CER
CLA itself. For example, state and local governments cannot be held liable for emer
gency actions taken to remedy releases or threatened releases from a third party's
facility. See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(d)(2) (1994). This section clearly recognizes (at least to a
limited degree) that there should be some grace granted to government agencies in light
of their regulatory capacity. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) indicates that the
government does not become an operator when it acquires ownership of a facility
through "bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." Id.
However, the courts have been slow to carve out exceptions to other types of CERCLA
liability for government agencies. See, e.g., Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Wash
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding owner and op
erator liability when a publicly owned sewer system leaked hazardous chemicals); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding arranger liability for
municipalities that disposed of household waste); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
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The Broad Remedial Purpose

Environmental contamination is indeed a problem of "national
magnitude. "283 A large portion of the hazardous waste in the
United States is improperly disposed of, often in poorly-operated
landfills. 284 In fact, in the early 1980's, the EPA found that more
than sixty percent of all landfills were not in compliance with gov
ernment environmental regulations, and over twenty percent were
found to have already caused contamination to air or water. 285 In
addition, the EPA estimated that seventy-three million Americans
lived in close proximity to a contaminated facility.286 These num
bers have skyrocketed; a more recent study estimates that over
eighty-five percent of Superfund sites have contaminated adjoining
waterS,287 and that seventy million Americans live within four miles
of a CERCLA site.288 The United States is indeed "neck-deep in
waste. "289
In passing CERCLA, to ease the burden of cleanup, "Congress
intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying
the harmful conditions they created."290 Accordingly, throughout
CERCLA's history courts have consistently recognized that the
statute is designed to provide a broad base of liable parties.291 In
the parent corporation context, the courts have repeatedly upheld a
corporate liability standard that extends far beyond traditional
County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding government owner liability for a release at
a public landfill).
283. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982).
284. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 211.
285. See id.
286. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame and Piercing the Veil in the Mists
of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent
Companies and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 115, 117
(1998) (citing Marc D. Potson, Comment, Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability:
Making the Responsible Party Pay, 3 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv., 216, 216 (1990».
287. See McCrory, supra note 39, at 60 (citing KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL.,
FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: WHO PAYS AND How? 20, 24 (1995».
288. See id. (citing Superfund Reassessment and Reauthorization: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment of the Senate Comm.
on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Congo 428 (1995) and U.S. EPA Synopsis: Superfund
Administrative Reforms, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1996 (1996».
289. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 200.
290. United States V. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982).
291. See supra note 2 for examples of the courts' recognition of the broad reme
dial purpose in the context of determining liability.
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common law practices. 292 However, the question remains whether
this type of policy consideration must extend to government actors.
Courts and commentators have generally agreed that the broad
remedial purpose is sufficient to justify holding government actors
liable under CERCLA.293 However, there remains a legitimate ar
gument that any form of government liability violates the broad re
medial purpose. As noted earlier, CERCLA's goal is to make the
polluter pay.294 In the corporate context this liability scheme is an
effective means of ensuring that the controlling parent corporation
does not escape liability. However, when the government pays for
cleanup, the taxpayer-not some distant third party-is stuck with
the bill.295 One could argue that this view is flawed because, in a
democratic government, decisiops are made by elected officials. 296
If the taxpayers elect officials who pollute, perhaps the voters
should pay for their error in judgment. In effect, each taxpayer
would become a parent of the elected government. However, this
argument ignores the fact that, unlike a parent corporation, the
public does not have the ability to control the day-to-day acts of
those people it places in power. A parent corporation may immedi
ately, and often with minimal formality, influence and overturn dis
favored decisions made by subordinates. Voters, on the other hand,
must wait until the next round of elections. In addition, voters only
wield power when acting as a group, unlike a parent corporation.
292. See Stewart & Campbell, supra note 3, at 7. See also supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text for further discussion of CERCLA's broad liability scheme.
293. See Steven G. Davison, Governmental Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C.
ENVIL. AFr. L. REv. 47, 127 (1997) (stating that government actors should be held
liable in the same circumstances as private actors); Ferrey, supra note 10, at 273-74
(noting that, given CERCLA's purpose, it would be inequitable to treat government
bodies, specifically municipalities, different than private actors); Williamson & Mc
Cann, supra note 4, at 438 (arguing that government immunity from CERCLA liability
would be inconsistent with Congress' intent in passing CERCLA). But see Olsen, supra
note 2, at 204 (noting that although government liability is a legal reality, the courts
should be careful not to impose such liability without consideration of the
consequences).
294. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the broad remedial purpose.
295. See Carley, supra note 26, at 105 ("When viewed in the context of the
United States as the 'polluter,' the basic policy goals of CERCLA are not furthered, as
the government does not pay; the taxpayer does."). In addition, liable corporations are
able to internalize the cost of cleanup by increasing prices. Government agencies that
do not make a profit from their regulatory activities have no way to dilute the effects of
cleanup costs other than to raise taxes. See also Tricia R. Russo, FMC Corp. v. United
States Department of Commerce: An Overexpansion of "Operator" Liability Under
CERCLA,7 VILL. ENVIL. L.J. 157, 178-79 (1996).
296. Except, of course, that administrative officials are appointed by elected
representatives.
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Thus, there is a serious question whether any form of government
operator liability supports the ideal of making the polluter pay.
On the other hand, some commentators have supported similar
treatment for government and private actors by citing the practical
effects of such liability. Commentators have noted three primary
reasons why CERCLA parent corporation liability supplants the
common law of limited liability: (1) possible liability encourages the
actor to closely regulate environmental compliance practices, (2) li
ability discourages potential actors from assuming the corporate
form for no other reason than to avoid liability, and (3) strict liabil
ity reduces transaction costs associated with many common law re
quirements of pleading and proof. 297 The first and third reasons
may apply to government actors as well as private actors. 298 The
public maintains a legitimate interest in having its governmental
bodies properly organize and manage their waste· facilities, and
transaction costs are reduced by strict liability in the government
context as well as in the private sphere. However, these arguments
provide weak support for government liability. Although there is a
public interest in properly managed waste facilities, government lia
bility may actually discourage government regulation. 299 Also, a re
duction in transaction costs, while generally beneficial, loses its
luster when it imposes liability in situations where liability would
otherwise be inappropriate.
Clearly, there are strong arguments that indiscriminate govern
ment liability does not support CERCLA's broad remedial pur
pose. However, despite any weight these arguments may carry, the
courts seem unprepared to eliminate government liability alto
gether. Instead, they appear to favor such liability on a limited ba
sis. To understand the courts' reluctance to impose government
liability it is essential to consider the dangers of overexposure to
operator liability.
2.

Government Overexposure: Burdening the Sovereign and
Creating a Disincentive to Regulate

Unlike private actors, governmental bodies "possess and exer
cise regulatory power in their capacity as guardians of the public
297. See Stewart & Campbell, supra note 3, at 8.
298. The second clearly does not apply, since businesses cannot assume a govern
mental form to escape liability.
299. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of how imposing government liability
could discourage involvement in waste disposal.
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health, safety, and welfare."300 Thus, it is common for government
involvement in the waste disposal process to be predicated upon the
responsibilities the government actor bears as the sovereign. 301 For
example, municipalities are almost invariably involved, either as di
rect participants or on a contractual basis, with the removal and
disposal of household (and sometimes industrial) waste. 302 As a re
sult, if courts began to impose liability on governmental bodies fre
quently, those agencies could be unduly burdened by cleanup
costS. 303
The Iron Mountain court found such arguments unconvincing,
stating that CERCLA's broad liability scheme does require private
parties to clean up hazards created by other parties. 304 However,
the parent corporation role in waste cleanup is not analogous to
that of governmental bodies. The essential difference is that the
government's role is not voluntary, whereas the private actor's con
duct is voluntary.305 Thus, it appears unfair to burden the govern
ment with liability based solely upon mandatory actions taken in a
regulatory function; the corporate actor faces no such similar
threat.
The Brighton concurrence noted one commentator's concern
that overexposing governmental bodies to liability could create a
disincentive to undertake any environmental regulation. 306 Such an
300. United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 324 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Moore, J., concurring).
301. See id. (Moore, J., concurring) (stating that "[g]overnmental entities increas
ingly are exercising their regulatory power in an effort to address the environmental
problems created by the release of hazardous materials").
302. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 233 (noting that municipalities in particular are
almost always engaged in some liability-creating conduct relating to the removal and
disposal of household and industrial wastes). At times, even this apparently benign
involvement may lead to liability. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1206 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment by municipalities claiming
immunity from arranger liability for disposal of normal household waste).
303. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 274 (stating that municipalities would face a
potentially immense financial burden under CERCLA liability predicated upon waste
removal).
304. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1445
(E.D. Cal. 1995) ("CERCLA does encourage private cleanup of pollution caused by
others by exposing current owners to liability and at the same time providing them with
a cause of action for the recovery of their costs.").
305. In other words, the sovereign does not "choose" to have regulatory con
trol-such control is normally mandated. On the other hand, the private actor has
control over whether to engage in the waste-producing activity or whether to purchase
a piece of polluted property.
306. See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 324 (Moore, J., concurring) (quoting,
Olsen, supra note 2, at 204 (stating that "widespread state liability may have a chilling
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influence could reduce necessary government involvement in envi
ronmental protection-certainly a result incompatible with the
broad remedial purpose of preserving the environment. 307 Another
commentator indicated that increasing government liability could
have a financial, as well as environmental, impact. 30B The cost of
liability would result in higher property taxes, and "[a]s a result,
current property taxpayers would indemnify [potentially responsi
ble] municipalities for past waste disposal practices . . . ."309
D.

Evaluating the Alternative Bestfoods Interpretations and
Synthesizing a Workable Test for Government Liability
For the reasons already discussed, governmental bodies should
be treated differently than corporations. 310 However, both the
traditional multi-factor tests and the Bestfoods definition fail to
properly balance the applicable policy considerations with the need
for a practical, consistent test for government operator liability.
This Note will now evaluate the shortcomings of each test and syn
thesize a workable liability standard.

The Traditional Multi-Factor Tests Are Ineffective
Because They Are too Easily Manipulated and
Unpredictable
Because courts using multi-factor tests have frequently recog
1.

effect on long-term remedial efforts, since states may be unwilling to act when CER
CLA liability is sure to be imposed"»; ct. Carley, supra note 26, at 102 ("If the federal
government were held liable for its attempts to clean up hazardous waste sites, the
government would not engage in such activities.").
307. One commentator has noted that this theory could also apply to parent cor
porations, by discouraging them from becoming involved in their subsidiaries' waste
management activities. See Silecchia, supra note 286, at 178-84. However, Silecchia
goes on to refute this argument, noting that there are five primary reasons that parent
corporation liability would not reduce involvement in waste disposal activities: (1) The
parent's financial ties to .the subsidiary encourage participation, (2) corporations may
often have subsidiaries large enough to handle waste management independently, (3)
parent corporations that own all of a subsidiary's stock will automatically exercise a
great deal of liability-creating control over management whether or not they actively
participate in waste disposal, (4) the parent will have an incentive to avoid environmen
tal litigation for the purposes of avoiding bad publicity, and (5) the expansive liability
scheme provided by Best/oods will encourage corporations to develop new waste dispo
sal technologies. See id.
308. See Ferrey, supra note 10, at 274-76.
309. Id. at 274; see also Russo, supra note 295, at 179-80 ("[FMC) has paved the
way for enormous governmental liability which will ultimately be paid with taxpayer
dollars."); Carley, supra note 26, at 95 ("Although it is difficult to estimate the financial
impact on the government of the [FMC court's finding of government liability], it is
clear that the cost will be significant. ").
310. See supra Part III.e.
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nized the possibility of government liability, but have imposed it
sparingly, it may seem that they have been approaching the prob
lem correctly all along. After all, at first glance such an approach
appears to give governmental bodies appropriate protection. How
ever, multi-factor tests are hopelessly malleable and unpredictable,
providing little guidance to courts or government actors.
The multi-factor tests' shortcomings become clear upon consid
eration of the holdings in United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc. 311 and Washington v. United States. 312 Both Iron Mountain and
Washington featured fact patterns quite similar in substance to
FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce,313 in which
the appellate court found liability. However, both district courts
rejected government liability, citing the absence of factors not men
tioned in previous cases. 314
In FMC, probably the most cited case on government operator
liability, the court adhered roughly to the employee/operational/fi
nancial control test, but added more specific factors that it called
"the leading indicia of control."315 The Iron Mountain court, de
spite the presence of considerable evidence of control,316 failed to
find liability based upon a series of three factors, two of which it
found were established by FMC.317 Even more dramatic is the
court's failure in Washington to find liability despite overwhelming
evidence of control.318 In Washington, the court dismissed what
have normally been considered the truly important indicia. Instead,
the Court relied on a set of four unusual factors, including two re
garding the relevance in FMC of the War Production Board and
311. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
312. 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
313. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
314. See supra Part I.C.2.b for a discussion of the holdings and tests applied in the
Iron Mountain and Washington cases.
315. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. For a list of these indicia, see supra text
accompanying note 161.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 189-191.
317. See supra text accompanying note 195 for a list of those factors. The third
factor, control over waste disposal, has clearly been established by a majority of cases
discussed in this Note. See supra Part I.C.2.b. However, it is interesting that the Iron
Mountain court chose to discuss it in relation to FMC. In FMC, the court found that
the government had knowledge of disposal techniques, understood that increased pro
duction meant increased waste, and provided some disposal equipment. See supra
notes 144-152. With the exception of providing equipment, these factors seem to be
present in Iron Mountain as well. See supra notes 189-195.
318. See supra text accompanying note 198 for a discussion of this evidence.
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national regulation,319 the fact that the shipyard was making the
same product,320 and the fact that the facility was never seized.
What appears to be happening is that each successive case declines
to find liability based on some factor established in the previous
case, preventing government liability even where substantial con
trol is evident.321
This case-by-case addition of factors invites judicial improvisa
tion and makes the traditional multi-factor tests completely unpre
dictable. 322 As revealed by Iron Mountain and Washington, liability
depends upon the inclinations of the individual judges. Accord
ingly, one commentator has noted that the multi-factor tests result
in an "adhoc factual analysis [that] may subject states to open
ended liability if the courts are not willing to closely examine the
particular state's alleged involvement at [the] ... site."323 History
has proven this prediction incorrect (as the multi-factor tests' flexi
319. Although, the court never explains what relevance this has and why it is
determinative.
320. However, it is obviously a questionable assertion that the shipyard would
otherwise have been producing mine-sweepers for private industrial consumption.
321. The list began to grow immediately following United States v. Dart Indus.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). In that case, the court gave little guidance, simply
requiring "hands on" activities. See id. at 146. The following year, the court in United
States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989), built upon the theoretical
foundation of Dart, but added an extensive list of factors to be considered. See id. at
869. Later, in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Third Circuit cited to New Castle, but added a new list of
factors that it called the "leading indicia of control." Id. The court used these factors to
impose liability upon the government. See id. at 844-45. The court in United States v.
Vertact Chemical Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 807-09 (8th Cir. 1995), drew upon the FMC factors
(apparently regarding certain of them as determinative) to find the government not
liable. In United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1430, 1449-50 (E.D.
Cal. 1995), a federal district court failed to find government liability because the facts of
the present case did not match up to the overwhelming indicia of control in FMC. Fi
nally, in Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474,485 (W.O. Wash. 1996), a federal
district court refused to find government liability based upon four arcane "determina
tive" factors established in FMC. See supra text accompanying note 201 for a list of
these factors.
322. This trend toward an increasingly long list of specific factors has effectively
shielded the government from operator liability, possibly to the point of violating CER
CLA's broad remedial purpose. By continuously adding to the list of necessary factors,
the courts have raised the evidentiary burden of parties seeking government liability.
Of course, the more factors that are added, the more difficult it is to show that those
factors have been satisfied. In addition, Iron Mountain and Washington illustrate a
developing trend toward regarding the factors as determinative, rather than cumulative,
despite the fact that courts have repeatedly stated that the test is the totality of the
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 327 (6th
Cir. 1998) (Moore, J., concurring); New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 869.
323. Olsen, supra note 2, at 204.
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bility has weighed for, not against, the government), but commenta
tors still generally agree that a greater degree of certainty in
assigning liability would be desirable. 324
One positive aspect of the multi-factor tests is that, if applied
consistently, they offer a detailed and useful standard for liability.
The problem is that they have not been applied consistently. Fur
thermore, the list of potential factors has become so long and con
voluted that it would be insufficient to simply state that the multi
factor tests are controlling. One would have to determine which
incarnation of the test is applicable.
2.

The Best/oods Definition Could Over-Expose the
Government to Liability and Is too Vague to
Serve as an Adequate Liability Standard

As the standard with the lower evidentiary burden (due to the
lack of specific facts that must be proven to establish liability), the
Best/oods definition is the test most likely to overexpose the gov
ernment to liability. The Best/oods Court simply stated that "an
operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically re
lated to pollution."325 One could argue that this test covers, by def
inition, every regulatory act taken by a governmental body.
However, imposing absolute government liability would clearly be
contrary to Congress' intent in passing CERCLA.326 It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court intended to create a
more discriminating liability standard than absolute liability.
On the other hand, one could argue that the Best/oods require
ment for affirmative acts precludes the possibility that a govern
ment actor could be held liable for mere regulation. In fact, the
Supreme Court specifically stated that an operator is one who "di
rects the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facil
ity."327 This, in conjunction with the requirement that control must
specifically relate to contamination,328 could give the government
324. See id. See generally Davison, supra note 293, at 127 (concluding that gov
ernment liability should be equivalent to private actor liability); Ferrey, supra note 10,
at 274-75 (stating that equity demands an even-handed approach to assigning liability);
Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 440-41 (noting that courts, when left to their
own devices, have a tendency to drift into "peripheral matters" rather than focus on the
important indicia of control).
325. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
326. See Williamson & McCann, supra note 4, at 443 (stating that Congress' in
tent was to only place liability upon "truly responsible parties").
327. Best/oods, 524 U.S. at 66.
328. See id.
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ample protection against unwarranted liability. It should also be
noted that in the one circuit case where the new definitional test has
been applied, it has been used to question a lower court's finding of
municipal liability.329 Still, because the Best/oods definition does
not rely on factors, the courts will lose the ability to raise the evi
dentiary burden against government actors. Consequently, they
will lose the ability to give governmental bodies adequate protec
tion from excessive liability.
The Best/oods definition is also far too vague to serve as a use
fulliability standard. One commentator has called the language of
the Best/oods definition broad and "susceptible to varying interpre
tations," noting that a number of words used by the Supreme
Court , including "manage"
" "direct" and "conduct" are no more
helpful than the word "operate," as used in CERCLA's statutory
language. 33o With only this vague guidance, it is inevitable that
courts will eventually revert to the old practice of relying on multi
factor tests. However, for better or worse, Best/oods is now the
controlling law. Thus, in order to follow the Supreme Court's hold
ing in that case, the lower courts will have to apply tests that take
into consideration the Best/oods definition.
3.

Synthesizing a Workable Test for Liability

The multi-factor tests, as applied by courts in the past, appear
too malleable and unpredictable. 331 In addition, they appear to cre
ate an unreasonably high bar to government liability. On the other
hand, the Best/oods definition is nebulous and vague, offering little
guidance to courts faced with determining government liability.
This test may also provide government actors with insufficient pro
tection from excessive liability. However, there is a way to combine
the best parts of the Best/oods definition and the traditional multi
factor tests to synthesize a workable standard for liability that also
addresses the need for certainty.
Best/oods should be read as advocating a multi-factor test;
however, unlike the Brighton concurrence's332 and dissent's333
readings of Best/oods, the Supreme Court's mandate should not be
329.
1998).
330.
331.
divergent
332.
333.

See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 319-21 (6th Cir.
See Silecchia, supra note 286, at 176-77.
See supra note 106 for examples of the courts' inconsistent applications and
interpretations of these tests.
See Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 327 (Moore, J., concurring).
See id. at 334 (Dowd, J., dissenting in part, concurring in p~rt).
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read as a reversion to the traditional test. As noted earlier, the
traditional multi-factor tests, like the Best/oods definitional test, al
low courts far too much leeway in determining not only liability, but
the standard for finding liability.334 In fact, the very vagueness of
the Supreme Court's definition in Best/oods indicates that the
Court must have intended for the definition to be used in conjunc
tion with some other method of liability determination. 335 To take
the vague Best/oods definition at face value would be an exercise in
futility without some deference to a more conclusive list of factors.
Still, the fact that the Court failed to recognize established prece
dent indicates that the Court did not intend a return to the old
multi-factor tests.
There is sufficient language in Best/oods to establish a new,
more conclusive, multi-factor test. The Supreme Court first stated
that "an operator is simply someone who directs the workings of,
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility."336 This seems suffi
cient to establish a requirement for affirmative acts, effectively
eliminating a test based on authority to control.
Next, the Court indicated that the actor must be involved in
"operations specifically related to pollution."337 This is a clear re
quirement that the actor have operational control, one of the three
traditional factors in the multi-factor tests.338 However, this leaves
open the question of what constitutes operational control. The
Court addressed this concern and indicated that the operations
must be those "having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazard
ous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regu
lations."339 This reveals that the operational control must
specifically relate to waste disposal. Although this could include
such factors as personnel and financial control (factors used by
courts prior to Best/oods), the test would only be satisfied if the
control specifically related to waste disposal. 340
334. See supra notes 323-324 and accompanying text for a discussion of commen
tators' criticisms of this test.
335. One commentator has noted that the Bestfoods decision left two significant
issues regarding operator liability undecided: (1) "how 'operator' should be defined for
purposes of assessing direct liability," and (2) "how the definition of 'operator' may
best be applied." Silecchia, supra note 286, at 122. In fact, Silecchia argued that these
questions are best handled by the legislature, not the courts. See id. at 178.
336. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
337. Id.
338. The other two factors are control over personnel and control over finances.
For further discussion of the development of this test, see supra Part I.e.
339. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67.
340. For example, suppose a municipality contracted for the operation of a land
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Finally, once a court determines that such operational control
exists, it must consider whether the control was "eccentric under
accepted norms" of governmental regulatory oversight.341 If so, it
is clear that the government has overstepped its bounds as the sov
ereign and has undertaken the role of "operator."
Thus, Bestfoods seems to advocate a new three-part test re
quiring: (1) affirmative acts of control over the facility, (2) opera
tional control relating directly to the disposal of hazardous waste,
and (3) evidence that such control was above and beyond the gov
ernment's normal regulatory power.
4.

Applying the New Test to Government Operator
Liability Cases

Applying this new test to some of the factual scenarios dis
cussed in this Note, it becomes clear that this synthesis achieves a
just result that balances CERCLA's competing policy interests. 342
Under the new test, the majority of decisions reached by the
courts are correct. For example, United States v. Iron Mountain
Mines, Inc. ,343 United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp. ,344 and FMC
Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce 345 were decided
correctly. In all three cases there were undoubtedly affirmative acts
of control by the government; therefore, the first prong of the new
test is satisfied. It is the second prong, operational control relating
to waste disposal, that necessitates closer examination.
In Iron Mountain, the court rightly declined to impose liability.
The new test upholds this determination because, although the gov
ernment took a high degree of control over the facility, it did not
control waste disposal. Although. the government hired personnel
fill. The town hired personnel, set wages, approved purchases of equipment (not re
lated to waste disposal), and helped set policies regarding operating hours. The
municipality, despite these elements of control, could not be held liable because it did
not exercise any of its control in the area of waste disposal. Although it had personnel
control, town officials did not make disposal decisions-the facility owner's managers
did. Although the town exercised financial control, it did not control items and equip
ment that affected waste disposal. Finally, even though it had some operational control
(setting hours), it did not affect the manner of the facility's operation regarding waste
disposal.
341. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72.
342. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's
competing policy interests.
343. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of
Iron Mountain.
344. 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of Vertae.
345. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). See supra Part 1.C.2.b for the facts of FMC.
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(and managed them to some degree), it was the civilian managers,
not the government, that made disposal decisions. 346 In addition,
there is no indication that the government hired any personnel at
the decision-making level. Also, despite the fact that the govern
ment made certain improvements to the facility347 and determined
what product it would make,348 none of these actions pertained di
rectly to waste disposal.
In Vertac, where the government exercised even less control
than it did in Iron Mountain, the court similarly found the govern
ment not liable. 349 In Vertac, the government had control over cer
tain health and safety related conditions at the plant,35o assisted the
facility in obtaining raw materials,351 and influenced what product
the facility produced. 352 However, as in Iron Mountain, none of the
control directly related to the disposal of waste. The Vertac court,
in fact, emphasized that the facility's owner was solely responsible
for waste disposal policy.353
In FMC, the court correctly imposed liability on the govern
ment. In that case, the government directly affected waste disposal
by placing in the facility government-employed, management level
personnel.354 Although there were many other indicia of govern
ment control upon which the district court focused,355 none of them
affected waste disposal. Thus, the one decisive factor in finding lia
. bility is that which implicates the disposal of waste.
On the other hand, under the new test, Washington v. United
States 356 was decided incorrectly. In Washington, like Iron Moun
tain, the government placed on-site supervisors in the facility who
"participated in managing and supervising the workers," and the
346. See Iron Mountain, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1450.
347. See id. at 1449.
348. See id. at 1436.
349. See Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d at 809.
350. See id. at 806-07.
351. See id. at 807.
352. See id. at 806.
353. See id. at 807.
354. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 837 (3d
Cir. 1994) (en banc). Note that this scenario is different from the one posed in the
hypothetical in note 340. The hypothetical government-hired employee was an em
ployee of the civilian owner (albeit chosen by the government) and was not a manage
ment-level employee, whereas in FMC the management personnel were government
employees.
355. See id. at 844-45.
356. 930 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Wash. 1996). See supra Part I.C.2.b for the facts of
Washington.
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government provided financing and equipment for use at the facil
ity.357 Also like Iron Mountain, this case contained numerous con
trol factors that could lead one to conclude, mistakenly, that the
government was an operator for CERCLA purposes. 358 Still, the
majority of the government's control factors had nothing to do with
waste disposal and thus should not be used to determine operator
liability. However, as noted earlier, the installation of government
managers was sufficient for liability to attach in FMC. 359 Through
these managers, the government had at least some degree of con
trol over the facility's waste disposal practices. Finally, the pres
ence of full-time government managers, as in FMC, indicated a step
above and beyond that which the government normally takes as a
regulator.
This new test may, on its face, appear to heavily favor govern
mental bodies; however, one must keep in mind that CERCLA's
purpose is to hold accountable those who were responsible for con
tamination. 360 Under this test, the government can only be held
responsible if it actively participated in the actual disposal of
waste-the very function CERCLA was intended to regulate.
CONCLUSION

The development of operator liability rules, particularly those
pertaining to the government, has involved a long and arduous pro
cess through the courts. In Best/oods, the Supreme Court provided
a far simpler test that has already been applied in Brighton; how
ever, the test has the potential of creating havoc in an area already
plagued by uncertainty. The benefits of this new test could be im
mensely augmented by synthesizing it with the traditional multi-fac
tor tests used by courts since CERCLA's inception. The new three
factor test advocated in this Note balances the competing policy in
terests of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose and the danger of
creating a disincentive to regulate. This test adds a degree of cer
tainty previously unavailable in' government operator liability
jurisprudence.

Christopher J. Plaisted

357, See id, at 483.
358. See id, at 483-84.
359. See supra notes 155-168 and accompanying text for the FMC court's defini
tion of "operator."
360. See supra note 2 for a discussion of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose.

